Volume 26

Issue 1

4-1922

Dickinson Law Review - Volume 26, Issue 7

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Dickinson Law Review - Volume 26, Issue 7, 26 DICK. L. REV. 186 ().
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol26/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Dickinson Law Review
Vol. XXVI

APRIL, 1922

No. 7

EDITORS
T. Millet Hand
Ben L. Stone
William F. Scheufele
Franklin E. Kantner

BUSINESS MANAGERS
Mark E. Garber
Edward N. Polisher
William J. B. Bloom
Emerson B. Rasbridge

W. Eugene Whitlinger

Eugene C. Sloan

Subscription Price $1.50 per Year

When Can An Executor Sell Real Estate ?
The laws of Pennsylvania have placed few restrictions
upon the disposition of real estate and personal property
by will. With the exception of provisions made for the
benefit of the testator's spouse and after born or adopted
children, the exaction of a substantial inheritance tax and
the protection of his heirs from death-bed remorse and
overreaching of third persons resulting in unnatural gifts to
charities, the owner's power of disposition of property after
death is hardly more limited than his right of alienation during his life. In the matter of the form of the testamentary
disposition the Legislature has likewise been most lenient
in making the only requirements of a will devising real estate that it be in writing signed by the testator at the end
thereof.
In interpreting the instrument by which the testator has
sought to control after death that which he enjoyed during
his life the courts have followed the principle that the intention of the testator as gathered from the entire instrument shall control. The natural result of this rule has
been almost innumerable cases in the courts involving the
interpretation of wills. Judging from the number of cases

DICKINSON LAw REVIEW

involved the haze seems exceptionally dense surrounding
the question of an executor's authority to sell real estate under absolute and discretionary powers of sale contained in
a will.
The purchaser of land from an executor at present
seems safe in relying upon one rule. Where the power of
sale in the will works an equitable conversion the executor can convey the title of his testator, subject only to
the lien of the testator's debts of record.
Equitable conversion is a fiction-wherein money directed to be employed in the purchase of land is treated as
land and land directed to be sold is treated as money created to sustain and carry out the intention of the testator
or parties. (Davidson's Ex. vs. Bright, 267 Pa. 580). The
conversion takes place as of the death of the testator. All
persons claiming under the will have their interest confined
to the fund realized by the executor, and creditors (other
than those having liens) are confined to the fund realized
from the sale. The purchaser of the land is therefore relieved from any obligation to see to the application of the
purchase money among either beneficiaries under the will
and heirs or creditors. The death of the testator not disturbing the lien of debts recorded or reduced to judgment
during his life time, the purchaser is bound to see to their
(Seeds vs.
payment or take the land subject thereto.
Upon being assured that an equitBurke, 181 Pa. 281).
able conversion has taken place the purchaser, therefore,
may rest at ease.
When, then, does a will work an equitable conversion
"The cases in which the docof land into personalty?
trine of equitable conversion has been discussed are legion
and in many different form of expression the courts have
(McConnell vs. Bryan, 62 Sup.
undertaken to define it."
quoted
statement of the doctrine is
178).
A frequently
of real estate into
a
conversion
the following: "To work
personalty there must be either (1 ) a positive direction to
sell; or (2) an absolute necessity to sell in order to execute
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the will; or (3) such a blending of realty and personalty,
by the testator, in his will, as to clearly show that he intended to make a fund out of both real and personal estate,
and to bequeath the same as money. In each of the two
latter cases an intent to convert is implied."
(Hunt's
and Lehman's Appeal, 105 Pa. 128). The presumption being against an equitable conversion, it is only where the
sale by the executor is obligatory that such conversion occurs. (Marr's Estate, 240 Pa. 38). The question being
one of the testator's intent, the obligation to sell must appear on the face of the will and the purchaser is not required to investigate beyond the will, whether or not a
neessity for the sale exists. Otherwise, "no prudent man
would buy under such a load of responsibility."
(Eisenbrown vs. Burns, 30 Sup. 460.)
The Supreme Court has, however, looked beyond the
will itself to determine that an equitable conversion took
place. Thus, where a testator gave his executor authority
to sell in these words, "Igive unto my executor full power
and discretion to sell any or all of my real estate whenever
any such sale shall be necessary or expedient for any purposes of my estate, of administration, distribution or otherwise," and made pecuniary bequests which happened to exceed his personal estate, a majority of the court held that
an equitable conversion of the real estate into personalty
was worked by the will. Chief Justice Mitchell dissented
on the ground that "The necessity to sell which effects a
conversion is one which must have been contemplated by
the testator in order to carry out the scheme of his will, not
a necessity as a matter of fact arising out of the actual circumstances of his estate after his death."
(Vanuxem's
Estate, 212 Pa. 315).
Where the power of sale vested in the executor is discretionary and not absolute no equitable conversion is
worked by the will and the land descends as such to the
heirs or devisees of the testator. The common debts attach as liens from the moment of death and a purchaser
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from the heirs or devisees takes subject to suclh lien.
(Seeds vs. Burk, 181 Pa. 281). Will the title of the heir
be divested by the executor's sale under this discretionary
authority?
In the case of Eberly vs. Kohler, 209 Pa. 298, the
testator after making pecuniary legacies in the amount of
$8,500, directed as follows: "Item. After the payment of
specific legacies aforesaid, the remainder of my estate shall
be divided into four equal shares, which I dispose of as
follows, viz:
"A. To my son, Ira S. Eberly, I give, bequeath and
devise one share, which shall include the two brick houses
-on High street, Mechanicsburg, Pa., at the valuation of
five thousand dollars. ..
"C. To my son, David M. Eberly, I give, bequeath
and devise one share, less five hundred dollars ($500.00)
bequeathed to his wife. . .
After providing that certain advancements made to his
sons should enter into the distribution of his estate, and disposing of the remaining shares he concluded, "I hereby authorize and empower my executor to sell all or any of my
estate, real or personal, not herein specifically bequeathed
or devised, either at public or private sale, and to execute
and deliver good and sufficient deeds for all real estate sold,
for the purpose of executing this will."
The personal estate being sufficient to pay the pecuniary legacies, debts and expenses, the executor entered
into a contract with defendant to sell part of the real estate
in order to make distribution of the estate in accordance
with the will. The purchaser refused to perform his contract to purchase on the ground that the executor was without authority to make a conveyance.
On a case stated, the lower court held that the will did
not work a conversion and (therefore) the executor was
without power to make a sale, referring to the opinion in a
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former case arising out of the same will, Eberly vs. Eberly,
205 May Term, 1903, Common Pleas, Cumberland County. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was
affirmed, per curiam, on the opinion of Judge Biddle in the
court below.
In the case of Eberly vs. Eberly, supra., the opinion of
the court was as follows: "The only provision made by
testator in regard to the sale of his property is the following: I hereby authorize and empower my executors to
sell all, or any part of my estate real or personal, not herein specifically bequeathed or devised either at public or private sale, and to execute and deliver good and sufficient
deeds for all real estate sold, for the purpose of executing
this will.'
"In Hunt's and Lehman's Appeal, 105 Pa. 128, the
following doctrine was laid down, which has been reaffirmed in many subsequent cases: 'Itought to be settled
by this time that in order to work a conversion there must
either be, 1st, A positive direction to sell; or 2nd, An absolute necessity to sell in order to execute the will; or 3rd,
Such a blending of real and personal estate, by the testator
in his will as to clearly show that he intended to create a
fund out of both real and personal estate, and to bequeath
The presumption is always
the said fund as money.'
against conversion and even where it is required it must be
Yerkes vs.
kept within the limits of actual necessity:
Yerkes, 200 Pa. 419."
"In the will before us there is no positive direction to
sell the real estate, and it does not appear by the case stated
that there is any necessity to sell it for the purpose of executing the provisions of the will; further, the realty and personalty are not so blended as to show that the testator intended to create a fund out of both, and to bequeath the
same as money. Consequently the plaintiff has no authority to make a sale of the lot of ground and dwelling houses
for the purposes of distribution. The fact that some of the
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real estate was devised at a valuation has no bearing on
the question at issue."
Judgment was entered for
defendant.
The parties interested in the proceeds of an executor's
sale of real estate are the creditors of the decedent, and his
heirs or devisees who, in the absence of a sale, would receive the land itself. In case of a sale under a discretionary
power must the purchaser see that the proceeds of the sale
are paid to the creditors and the heirs or devisees? This
question was presented to the Supreme Court in Davidson's
Exc. vs. Bright, 267 Pa. 580, a case arising out of the refusal of the purchaser from the Executrix of Chas. P. Davidson, dec'd., to purchase real estate within a year of the
death of the testator on the ground, 1st, that the executrix
had no power to convey and, 2nd, that she could not convey a title free of the lien of general debts.
The will of the testator contained, I st, a positive direction for payment of debts; 2nd, a devise of one-third of
his property to his wife; 3rd, a direction that the executor
pay to the father and mother of testator during their joint
lives and the life of the survivor the sum of $75. per month;
4th, a residuary devise to his children, and 5th, the power
of sale quoted in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
"Unless," says Justice Kephart, "'we hold that a direction 'to pay all my just debts and funeral expenses' in one
item of a will and in another the power, 'I hereby authorize my executor to make sale of any of my real estate,' work
a conversion at the moment of testator's death, breaking
the descent and vesting the entire estate as personalty, or
that section 30 of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917 controls, we
are bound to reverse this judgment," which was in favor
of the executor-vendor-the lower court having decided
that the will worked an equitable conversion. Finding
nothing in the will to indicate a positive direction to sell or
a necessity to sell to execute the will, nor such a blending
of real and personal property as would create a fund to
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devolve as personalty the court decides that no equitable
conversion was worked by the will.
The effect of Section 30 of the Fiduciaries Act, says
the court, is that the lien of general debts "will be discharged not only by judicial sale, but also by sale under
the discretionary power ......

..

the land having

passed as land and the lien having attached, when the land
is sold under the power before the expiration of the year,
the purchaser takes the land free of debt" and "the creditor still has a claim on the purchase money realized from
the sale."
As far as his obligation to look to the payment of creditors and heirs of the testator is concerned, the purchaser
under a discretionary power of sale stands now with the
purchaser under an absolute power-under no obligation
whatever.

But the case of Eberly vs. Kohler was concerned not with the application of the purchase money but

with the right in the executor to make a sale.

Does Sec-

tion 30 of the Fiduciaries Act, by implication, invest the
executor under a discretionary power of sale with power
to make a sale when in fact (outside the will, of course),
the necessity to sell has ceased to exist?
If this question
can be answered in the affirmative, the purchaser from an
executor need but examine the will for a bare power of
sale, and, finding that, he will receive the testator's title
discharged of claims of heirs and common creditors.

If the

answer is that contained in Eberly vs. Kohler, and upon examining the will he find merely a discretionary or bare
power of sale, the purchaser must look beyond the will to
ascertain if the facts connected with the administration of
the estate show a necessity for a sale. The title of the
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purchaser then depends upon facts which may be decided
differently by every jury to which they may be presented.
Until the doctrine of Eberly vs. Kohler is overruled the
purchaser under a discretionary power of sale must assume this burden.
JOHN E. MYERS.

NOTE-In Palmer vs. Coulson, No. 82, October Term, 1921,
Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Judge Biddle, a successor
to the author of the opinion in Eberly vs. Eberly, quoted above,
decided that where a will contained a discretionary power of
sale for payment of debts, the purchaser from the executor after
the expiration of a year from the decedent's death, there being
no lien debts at the time of sale, did not receive a valid title, on
the grounds (1) that there was no equitable conversion; (2) that
no necessity for a sale existed, and (3) that Section 30 of the
Fiduciaries Act of 1917 has no application where the reason or
necessity for a sale does not exist.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH vs. HENDRICKS
Criminal Law-False Pretenses-Jurisdiction-Act of March
31st, 1860, Sec.111, P. L. 382
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hendricks, in Cunberland County, Pa., desiring to purchase
clothes in New York forwarded to V, then a merchant, a false
statement of his worth, the size of his business, and the profits
made in the last three years, etc. Influenced by this statement,
the clothes were shipped from New York to Mechanicsburg, Pa.
Payment not being made, information was made against Hendricks for obtaining goods under false pretenses. The defendant
alleges that the goods were received in New York and the false
statement made there. The court allowed a conviction, motion
for a new trial.
R. Morgan for Commonwealth.
Miller for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MARSDEN, J.-It is not our purpose to discuss the defenses
which might be allowed in a foreign jurisdiction. Whether or
not the defendant would be guilty in a New York Court is entirely
irrelevant. It is plain that the defendant resided in Pennsylvania,
conducted his business in this state and ultimately received the
goods here.
The 111th section of our criminal code, Act of March 31st,
1860, provides that any person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
if he, by any false pretense, obtain from any other person any
chattel, money or valuable security with intent to cheat and defraud any person of the same. In order that a person be guilty
under this statute it is only necessary to prove that (1) he made
a false pretense, (2) that he obtained property by it and (3) that
he possessed an intent to defraud. There is no question that
these three elements were present. The only question that deserves consideration is whether or not the goods in question were
obtained in New York or Pennsylvania.
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The learned counsel for the defendant contends that under
The Uniform Sales Act property or ownership passes to the buyer
upon delivery of the goods to a carrier, except where the seller
has retained the title to the goods until payment is made. It is
true that the defendant obtained the goods, but did he obtain
title? Section 18 of this same act states that where there is a
contract to sell specific or ascertained goods, the property in them
is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred. It is quite obvious that the
seller in New York only intended that the title in the chattel
should pass under conditions that never existed. The contract
was made voidable by the defendant's fraud and title never
passed. The seller could have exerted his ownership in the goods,
so long as they did not pass to an innocent third person, for
value.
No branch of the law is more confusing than the question of
deliveries. However, in our case the vital point is the ascertaining of the place where the obtaining was completed. We must
regard the word "obtaining" as meaning the actual physical possession; the question of title is not involved. The defendant did
every act which consummated the crime in this state and the
fruits of his fraud came into his possession here.
The facts in the case of Commonwealth vs. Schmunk, 22 Pa.
Superior Court 348, wherein the defendant was found to be
guilty, are nearly identical with those in the case at bar and under
the existing circumstances we must deny the motion for a new
trial.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
We think it immaterial, where the false pretenses are made,
which result in obtaining goods. They might be made in New
York, but if the goods, in consequense of them, were obtained in
Pennsylvania, the crime of obtaining, etc., would be committed
here. In Rex vs. Burdett, 4 Barn & Ald. 95, cited by Brown J.,
in Comm. vs. Schmunk, 207 Pa. 544, (affiming 22 Supr. Court
348), it was said that, a letter containing the pretense being
mailed in England to a person in France, the pretense was made
in England. We do not deem it necessary to concur in this view.
The important question is, where was the obtaining? Was
it in New York? The title passed there. The carrier was the
agent of -the defendant, and its possessions was his possessions.
But, distinction, in the Law of Sales, is made between the putting of the thing sold in the possession of a carrier and the put-
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ting it in that of the buyer. Before that of the carrier has been
followed by that of the buyer, the vendor, for fraud, etc., may
arrest the transit, and regain possession of the goods. Brown,
J., thinks that the goods are "obtained" in the sense of the
statute, only when the transit is ended, and the article has got
into the literal possession of the buyer, 207 Pa. 544. The court
below has taken the same view, and the judgment of conviction
must therefore be
AFFIRMED.

PITKIN vs. HAZZARD
Bond-Payment-PresumptionEvdence---Burden

of Proof

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hazzard executed to X a bond for $1000, payable in one
year. X lived for fifteen years after the bond became due, and
then died, devising the bond to Pitkin. Pitkin has allowed 10
years to elapse since X's death, and now sues on the bond. The
defense is payment presumed from the lapse of time. Pitkin
testifies that he has never been paid. Hazzard, gravely ill, has
not testified. The court decides that the presumption of payment
was erroneous and decided for Pitkin.
Hoffman for the Plaintiff.
Kelly for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ANDERSON, J.-That there was a presumption of payment
in this case is an undoubted fact and well settled according to
principles of law; but as to what will overcome it raises a more
difficult matter for determination.
X had the bond for fifteen years, without proceeding upon it,
after his right to do so had accrued. Had the instrument in controversy not been excepted from the Statute of Limitations it
would have been barred twice by that statute as it exists at
present in our state. Yet Pitkin fails to show any reason why X
failed to proceed on the bond. Pitkin also kept the bond for a
period of ten years, a period much greater than that of the
Statute of Limitations, without, at this trial, offering proof of
the cause of such delay or excusing his laxity. "The presumption
which the law raises after the lapse of twenty years, that a bond
or specialty has been paid, is in its nature essentially different
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from the bar of the Statute of Limitations to the recovery of a
simple debt. The latter is a prohibition of the action, the former,
prima facie, obliterates the debt. The bar is removed by nothing
less than a new promise to pay, or an acknowledgment consistent with such promise. The presumption is rebutted, or, to speak
more accurately, does not arise where there is afiramative proof
beyond that furnished by the specialty itself, that the debt has
not been paid, or where there are circumstances that sufficiently
account for the delay of the creditor." Reed vs. Reed, 46 Pa.
242. This is a quotation from the leading case in Pennsylvania
on the point at issue. We readily see the purpose of the Statute
of Limitations and the presumption of payment of specialties after twenty years; it is to save defendants in actions on such instruments from being proceeded against after they have by lapse
of time, due the failure to, or intention not to, proceed, on the part
of the plaintiff, until they have lost their witnesses or evidence.
One is a complete bar after six years and the other is a means of
making holders of bonds more diligent in their collection. Where
they have been backward they must furnish proof "beyond that
furnished by the bond itself, that the debt has not been paid, or
where there are circumstances that sufficiently account for the
delay of the creditor."
In all the cases that have been decided by the courts of this
state, there have been circumstances tending to explain or excuse
the delay or laxity on the part of the plaintiff; here we have no
such evidence, all we have is the testimony of the plaintiff that
the bond has not been paid. Every plaintiff, in such a case, by
merely instituting the action to recover asserts that much; and he
surely does, although it does not appear in the reports, make
such testimony a part of his case on the trial, and in no case did
the plaintiff rest after merely offering such evidence. The purpose of the rule is to make the plaintiff account for such laxity on
his part; can the mere testimony of the plaintiff that the bond
has not been paid, in any case, be sufficient?
We admit that
there might be cases in which this might be so. See Trickett on
Law of Limitations, Sec. 317, p. 458.
"The burden of overcoming it was upon the plaintiff, and
the sufficiency of the evidence offered was for the court." Richards vs. Walp, 221 Pa. 412.
In the record of the facts as subntted to us, appear the following: "Hazzard, gravely ill, has not testified." This fact must
have been brought out in the court below or it would not appear in the record of the facts; it was apparently given as a
reason for Hazzard's failure to appear and testify for himself in
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contradiction of the allegation of non-payment. It does not appear that the court did or did not take this fact into consideration
in arriving at the sufficiency of the evidence. But it was one of
the facts as submitted to us. This cannot be taken against Hazzard. The burden was on the plaintiff, and the defendant could rest
on the presumption of payment. The presumption must be overcome by the evidence of the plaintiff, alone. "The opinion of the
court bdlow refers to the fact that the defendant, although present in court failed to testify to the payment of the judgment.
Upon reflection we are of the opinion that the legal aspect of the
case was not affected thereby. The burden was upon the plaintiff to overcome the presumption of payment, and the court had
to decide the case upon its evidence and not by what defendant,
who offered no testimony, failed to prove," 268 Pa.415.
The court may have been right as to the sufficiency of the
evidence to overcome the presumption, and they, again, may not
have been. It is not for us here, being unable to hear the witness and note his demeanor, etc., to decide; and it is not our policy
to interfere with the judgment of the lower courts in such matters unless they are manifestly wrong and their wrong has done
an injustice in the case. But, as stated before, how are we to
tell whether, or how much, weight, the fact that the defendant
failed to testify had on the court; if it had any the judgment is
against the evidence, if it had none the judgment must stand, for
there are, and may be, cases in which the testimony of the plaintiff alone would, in the judgment of the court hearing it, be sufficient to overcome the presumption.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Twenty-five years have elapsed since the bond, on which the
suit is brought, became due. After 20 years there is a presumption of payment, which may be overcome by evidence warranting
the inference of non-payment.
The bond was payable to X for fifteen years. Was it paid
to him? We have no negating evidence.
The bond became Pitkin's, who testifies that he has never
been paid. This testimony, if believed, rebuts the presumption
of payment during the 10 years of his ownership; but it has no
bearing on payment during the preceding 15 years. Cf. Cannon
vs. Hileman, 229 Pa. 414.
Hazzard might have testified that he paid the bond, but he
has not testified. Serious illness is suggested as an explanation.
But, were there no explanation of the omission to testify, no in-
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"Upon
reflection," said Walling, J., "we are of the opinion that the legal
aspect of the case was not affected thereby. The burden was
upon plaintiff, to overcome this presumption of payment, and
the court had to decide the case upon its evidence and not by
what defendant, who offered no testimony failed to prove." Gilmore vs. Alexander, 268 Pa. 415.
The judgment for the defendant is
AFFIRMED.

BEISTLINE vs. CURRAN
Malicious Prosecution-Probable Cause-Advice
Advice of the Justice of Peace

of Counsel

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Curran informed Beistline, accusing him of larceny of an
automobile. Before doing so, he discussed the matter with the
justice who issued the warrant, laying the facts fully before him.
He had previously done the same to a member of the bar. Both
advised him that the facts stated made Beistline a thief of the
automobile, and that he could be convicted. An indictment was
found against Beistline but at the trial he was acquitted. He
now brings this action of trespass for malicious prosecution.
The court tells the jury that the opinion secured from the justice and attorney would protect Curran from liability. Verdict
for Curran.
Blumenthal for the Plaintiff.
Jurchak for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
DOEHNE, J.-This is an action of trespass for malicious
prosecution. To maintain an action of trespass for malicious
prosecution, it must be shown by the plaintiff that (1) the motive of the party, prosecuting the suit, was malicious; (2) that
the suit prosecuted was without probable cause; (3) that the
suit terminated in favor of the plaintiff; 38 Cyc. 516. The facts
show that not one of these requisites have been satisfied, and
this circumstance alone would be sufficient reason to affirm
the judgment of the learned court below.
However, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that
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a defendant, who undertakes to overcome the presumption of
malice by showing that before commencing the prosecution he
consulted counsel, must also show that he fairly and honestly
stated his whole casd to his counsel in order to rely upon advice of
counsel as a defense to an action for malicious prosecution;
Leaky vs. Mauk, 155 Pa. 458. While this case is very similar in
point of fact to the case at the bar, it is shown by the facts of
the case now before the court that the defendant did fully and
honestly present his whole case to the justice and the attorney.
Consequently, whether or not the facts of the case were or were
not laid fully and honestly before counsel is a question not at
issue in this cause, is not a question of fact for the jury, and the
Court did not err in charging the jury; ".that the opinion secured from the justice and the attorney would protect Curran
from liability." Furthermore, it is within the province of the
Court, not the jury, to determine whether or not on the facts as
found "the plaintiff has proved such want of probable cause of
action;" 26 Cyc. 106; Travis vs. Titus Smith, Jr., 1 Pa. 234.
But, although the plaintiff has proved his alleged cause of
action, it is a full defense if the defendant can show that he
acted upon the advice of an attorney, after laying the facts fully
before him (and such was done in the present case), and this no
matter how erroneous the advice may be; 26 Cyc. 451; Beihofer
vs. Loeffert, 159 Pa. 374; Leaky vs. Mauck, 155 Pa. 458.
After due deliberation upon the facts of the above case and
in consideration of the authorities touching upon the same, the
judgment of the learned court below must be
AFFIRMED.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The instruction that the opinion of the justice, that a prosecution for larceny would be warranted would exonerate the defendant from liability for the prosecution was erroneous. Brobst
vs. Ruff, 100 Pa. 91, Beihoffer vs. Loeffert, 159 Pa. 374.
But the advice of an attorney-at-law furnishes such exoneration, 159 Pa. 374, supra.
The judgment of the learned trial court is well sustained
by its lucid opinion
AFFIRMED.
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KEPPEL vs. STEARNS
Contract-Breach

of Warranty-Assumpsit-Unform

Sales

Act May 19th, 1915, Sec. 69, P1 L. 543
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Stearns sold a horse to Keppel for $300, warranting him
to be in all respects sound. Three months later, a defect was
discovered in the horse, which existed before and at the time of
sale. Keppel decided that he could not keep the horse and returned him to Stearns, who declined to receive him except as
bailee for Keppel. Affirming the rescission of the sale, this is
assumpsit for the purchase money.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FORCEY, J.-From the early Pennsylvania authorities, it
may clearly be deduced that, in order that rescission might be
consummated by the rescinding vendee, at least some semblance of
fraud must have been practiced upon the vendee sometime during or prior to the sale; and that a breach of warranty, in and of
itself, was not a sufficient justification for rescission-an action
on the breach, solely, would lie in such event. Confirming this,
we cite the case of Freyman vs. Knecht, 78 Pa. 141.
Since the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act (Pa. Act May
19, 1915, P. L. 543), the vendee's plight is no longer peculiarly
restrictive; neither is his course of pursuance enigmatical, nor is
it conjectural. Likewise, fraud enters not one iota into the transaction to "alter, contradict, or vary" the modus operandi of rescission. The 69th Section of the above act sets forth specifically and unequivocally: "Where there is a breach of warranty
by the seller" (as in the case before us), "the buyer may, at his
election,-(clause D) rescind the contract to sell or the sale and
refuse to receive the goods, or, if the goods have already been
received, return them or offer to return them to the seller, and
recover the price or any part thereof which has been paid."
Thus, we gather from the statute that "one increasing purpose runs" in respect to the purchaser's rights, i. e., he is afforded
greater leeway in averting hazardous and disastrous transactions,
so long as he himself is in nowise unscrupulously instrumental.
We "neither can nor dare retract anything" in the statute; our
word is captive to, and our acts are peremptorily guided by, the
provisions of that or any other statute.
Assumpsit, therefore, must needs lie in favor of the Plaintiff
to the amount of the purchase prite of the horse.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The section of the Sales Act, quoted by the learned court
below is decisive of this case. The same principle had been previously recognized in Byrne vs. Elfreth, 41 Supr. Ct. 572. Tiffany
on Sales, page 368 et seq.
The judgment is
AFFIRMED.

COOPER vs. TRASK
Trespass--Cause of Action-Public Policy-Privilege of Witness
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In a suit by Cooper against X for a debt of $5000, on a bond,
Trask, a witness for X, testified that the signature of X was a
forgery. The result was a verdict and judgment for the defendant. Cooper alleging that Trask's testimony was perjured, sues
him (a) for the loss of the $5000, and (b) for -the defamation involved in asserting that Cooper was attenmpting to enforce a
forged bond. Verdict for the plaintiff. Motion for a new trial.
Kirst for the Plaintiff.
Lewis for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KELLEY, J.-The answer of the defendant's motion for a new
trial depends upon two questions namely:
1. Whether the allegation of Cooper that Trask's testimony
was perjured, can be sustained in a civil action for damages.
2. And whether the elements of defamation were present
to sustain the cause of action:
The plaintiff in the case at bar, seeks to recover in a civil
action, the amount he alleges he lost, and assigns as one of his
grounds, the perjury of the defendant Trask.
Numerous decisions in this State and elsewhere seem to unqualifiedly assert that no civil action for damages can be maintained for alleged false testimony given on the witness stand.
Public policy and the safe administration of justice require
that witnesses who are a necessary part of the judicial machinery
be privileged against any restraint except that imposed by the
penalty of perjury. 24 L. R. A. New Series 265; 232 Pa. 509.
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As to the second allegation, the Court cannot perceive on
what grounds it can be sustained.
It seems to be uniformly held in this country, when counsel,
parties or witnesses indulge in false and defamatory statements,
which are not material or pertinent to the questions involved in
the judicial proceedings in which they are made, the injured party
may maintain a civil action therefor, by showing that the defendant made the statement in bad faith. In such a case, the
question at issue is one of "conduct, of motive, of good faith, and
honest purpose, or of bad faith and malicious purpose." The
plaintiff must allege that the statement was not only false and
malicious, but that it was not pertinent, and that it was made in
bad faith. And the burden of proof is upon him to establish
these allegations. 42 N. Y. 161; 130 Mich. 177; 97 Tex. 544:
Good faith is presumed where the occasion is a privileged
one. It prevents the inference of malice which the law draws
from unauthorized communications. If fairly warranted by any
reasonable occasion or exigency and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and the
welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the right to
make them, within any narrow limits. Briggs vs. Garrett,
111 Pa. 404.
In the case at bar, the defamation alleged was pertinent and
very material to the controversy, and therefor it is not actionable,
even though it was both false and malicious. This privilege is
based on a wholesome public policy which regards the public good,
resulting from a free and untrammeled inquiry in courts of justice as paramount to the redress of occasional private wrongs
which may result from an abuse of the privilege.
It would multiply and extend litigation if the matter could
be re-examined by a new action between a party to the action and
a witness therein. And more than that, witnesses would be intinmidated if their testimony is given under liability of themselves
being subjected to the expense and annoyance of being sued by
any party to the action, to whom their testimony might not be
agreeable. It would give a greater leverage to litigants to intimidate witnesses.
And it is a matter of law for the court to determine whether
the occasion of writing or speaking defamatory language, which
would otherwise be actionable, repels the inference of malice,
constituting a privileged occasion; and if there is not extrinsic or
intrinsic evidence of malice, it is the duty of the court to direct a
nonsuit or verdict for the defendant.
That it was error on the part of the court to submit the ques-
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tion to the jury, has been established by previous decisions in this
State. 152 Pa. 406; 111 Pa. 145; 8 Sup. 605.
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL GRANTED.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME "COURT
The inadequacy of the justice of the State is exhibited by
-the results of the principle which its courts have adopted, the
principle, viz., that for false swearing in a trial the only bad consequence to the swearer shall be his liability to the punishment for
the crime of perjury.
Trask has defeated by perjury, Cooper's recovery of $5000
to which he was entitled. Cooper's only redress is by the institution of a prosecution, in which, if it is successful, no compensation for the injury suffered will be recovered. Witnesses would
be "intimidated" said Clark, C. J., if civilly liable, as if that were
not a good thing. Godette vs. Gaskill, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 265;
Yoder vs. Cole, 232 Pa. 509. They can be intimidated by the risk
of imprisonment for perjury but not by the risk of compulsion to
make pecuniary atonement to the man whom their perjury has injured. There must be a little coercion to speak the truth, but
not too much.
How admirable the policies for which the judges occasionally
make themselves sponsors.
The judgment of the learned court below is
AFFIRMED.

ARNOLD vs. COAL CO.
Negligence-Master and Servant-Employment of Minors Under
Eighteen-Act of May 13, 1915, P. L. 286--Contribntory
Negligence-False Statements of Minors
STATEMENT OF FACTS
P. M. Arnold, alleged to have been under fifteen years old,
was employed by the defendant company to oil the machinery. In
doing so he was seriously injured in consequence of unusual rashness and heedlessness. In the suit for damages the defense is (a)
his own negligence caused the accident and (b) he was in fact
over fifteen years old when he was employed. The boy testified
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to his own age, as did also his parents. The defendant offered
proof that he had said, when asking for employ, that he was sixteen years old. His appearance indicated that he was of that age.
The court held that his negligence was immaterial if he was in
fact under fifteen. -It rejected proof of the plaintiff's declarations as to age. The jury below brought in verdict for $2,000
and the defendants move for new triaL
Doehne for the Plaintiff.
Carter for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BROOMALL, J.-In this case the main questions are:
Whether the boy's unusual rashness was such as to make him
guilty of contributory negligence, and his deceptive statements as
to age, such as would exempt the employer from liability for subsequent injury.
The Child Labor Act, P. L. 1915, page 296, provides that it
shall be unlawful for any person to employ any minor between
14 and 16 years of age, unless such n-inor shall, during such
period of employment, attend, eight hours a week, a school approved by the State Superintendent of Instruction; that all employed shall be required to present employment certificates from
proper officials. A certificate of physical fitness issued by a physician, approved by proper school authorities is also required. The
Act further provides that no minor, under 18 years of age, shall
be employed or permitted to work in oiling or cleaning machinery. None of these requirements were complied with.
It is true that ordinarily "one cannot recover damages for an
injury, which by the exercise of reasonable care he might have
avoided." Del. L. W. R. R. vs. Cadow 120 Pa. 559, also see L.
R. A., 1915 C. 820. But where the the injury complained of is
one arising directly out of the negligence of the defendant, in
failing to comply with statutory requirements, such is not the law.
The case of Kruttes vs. Bulls Head Coal Company, 249 Pa. 164,
in which the Act of May, 1909 P. L. 375, relating to the employment of minors in coal breakers, was before the court for construction on this point. Justice Moschzisker there said: "When
the employment of a minor is shown to be forbidden, by a statute
like the Act of 1909 supra, that in itself is sufficient evidence of
the defendant's negligence, and if the injury complained of occurred in the course of such unlawful connection, that is enough
to show a causal connection, and the law will refer the injury to
the original wrong." See Stable vs. Jaegn Automatic Co., 225
Pa. 348, and Synescenski vs. Schmidt, 153 Mich. 438.
Applying by analogy the Act of 1915, it will readily be seen
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that the defendant will be considered negligent in law.
Next, as to false statements of boy, at time of employment.
If the law contains no provision or if the employer has failed to
comply with prescribed requirements, then he takes workers into
his service at his own risk, so far as their age is concerned, and
a false statement by an employee will in no sense bar a recovery
for subsequent injury. Kruttes vs. Bull Head Coal Co., supra,
Hrabshak vs. Del. & Hudson Co., 54 Pa. Superior 626, 632; Dirkham vs. Wheeler, 38 Wash. 415; American Car and Foundry Co.,
214 Ill.,
509, Synessenski vs. Schmidt, 153 Mich., 438. Judge
Rice, speaking in Hrabshak vs. Delaware & Hudson Company,
said: "In Pennsylvania the requirement of a statute adopted in
the exercise of the police powers for the protection of its citizens
Parcannot be impliedly waived in the contract of employment.
ticularly is this true in the employment of children. Volgago vs.
Carnegie Steel Co., 226 Pa. 514. The mere fact that he misrepresented his age does not render it nugatory and relieve the employer from the consequences of putting him at a prohibited employment."
The Act does not provide that the employer shall not be held
liable, if the employment was bona fide on his part. But it expressly states that no minor whatever under the age of 18 years
should be employed in oiling machinery, etc.
In view of the foregoing facts and law the judgment of the
court below must be
AFFIRMED.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Act of May 13, 1915, P. L. 286 in section 5 directs that
"No minor under 18 years of age shall be employed or permitted
to work in * * * oiling or cleaning machinery in motion." The
defendant so employed the plaintiff in violation of the statute.
An accident has occurred to the boy. It is therefore liable for
the damages.
It matters not that the boy used deception as to his age, if
he did in fact use it, in order to secure his employment. Krutlies
vs. Coal Co., 249 Pa. 162.
That the boy was in fact under the age which qualifies for
employment is clear. His own testimony and that of his parents
establish this. His having said, when seeking employ, that he
was over the age, is not sufficient to overcome the testimony.
The boy was negligent. Negligence in a boy is precisely
what the statute anticipates and to prevent the consequence of
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which it seeks. It would defeat the purpose of the statute, to hold
that contributory negligence, even "unusual rashness and recklessness" would protect the employer from liability. 249 Pa. 162
supra. Stehle vs. Automatic Machine Co., 220 Pa. 617; Lenahan
vs. Pittston Coal Co., 218 Pa. 311.
The lucid opinion of the trial court well supports its judgment, which is
AFFIRMED.
CONVERSE vs. VAUGHN
Contracts -- Impossibility of

Performance

-

Total Destruction

of Subject Matter
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A non-suit was entered against the plaintiff in the court below. This a motion by the plaintiff for this court to strike off the
non-suit. The facts as stated by both attorneys are as follows:
"Vaughn, owning a timber tract, contracted with Converse
to cut the timber into logs and deliver them by a certain date.
Relying on this contract, Converse made contracts with sundry
persons to deliver lumber to them. Before Vaughn had cut many
of the trees a fire swept down from the neighboring mountain and
destroyed all his trees, making performance of the contract impossible. This is an action for damages for the non-delivery of
the timber. The court refused to permit a recovery."
Dickinson for Plaintiff.
Falvello for Defendant.
HUTCHISON, J.-Under the head of Contracts in a paragraph entitled, "Destruction of Subject Matter," we find the following: "Whete th contracts relate to use or possession or any
dealing with specific things in which the performance necessarily
depends on the existence of the particular thing, the conditiofi is
implied by law that the impossibility arising from the destruction
of thing, without default in party shall excuse the performance,
because from nature of contract it is apparent that the parties
contracted on basis of the continued existence of subject of contract."

13 C. J. 643.

There are two exceptions to this general rule. (1) Where the
thing destroyed is something which one party has expressly contracted to produce or manufacture. (2) In case where the destruction of thing is a contingency which is reasonably anticipated.
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6 R. C. L. Sec. 367 gives the same general rule and in substance similar exceptions. They are: (1) To excuse non-performance on ground of an Act of God, there must be no negligence,
or want of diligence, judgment or skill on part of promissor; and
(2) no forseeabiity of contingency arising.
The rule has been followed in 93 Pa. 499, where the failure
of a spring was considered the destruction of the subject matter
of the contract.
A flood which destroyed subject of contract was considered
as a valid reason for non-performance in 54 Pa. 291. A case
directly on point is that of Dixon vs. Breon, 22 Sup. 340. In our
case it is evident from the nature of the contract that the parties
contracted on basis of the continued existence of subject of contract. It was the certain timber which was to be cut into logs not
a certain number of logs. There was .no negligence on part of
promissor. There was no reasonable anticipation of a fire such as
occurred. Thus this case comes under the general rule as stated
in C. J. and R. C. L. In the case of Breon vs. Dixon the facts
are substantially the same. In both cases the contract was one
of sale and purchase of logs to be cut from timber standing on
land of the vendor. In each case a forest fire destroyed the logs
and thereby rendered performance of the contract impossible.
The vendor was excused from performance and liability for nonperformance on ground that subject matter of the contract was
specific property and the contract was based on the continued existence of the subject matter and so the destruction of the subject made further performance impossible and further liabilities
under same could not arise.
The plaintiff could not recover under the Sales Act of 1915
for under Section 17 the property had not passed. His remedy if
possible would come under Section 67, but in order to recover
there it must be shown that the non-delivery was wrongful negligence or a direct refusal. This can not be shown in case at bar.
In view of strong case based on principles of law followed
in our jurisdiction that the defendant is able to produce, we affirm the judgment of the learned court below and dismiss the motion to set aside the compulsory non-suit.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The contract was to cut certain trees into logs and to deliver
the logs to Converse. It was not said that the cuting should be
conditioned upon the continuance in existence of the trees. But
some conditions are implied, and the continuance of the trees, we
must believe was one of these. Says Anson, Contracts P. 434
(Corbin's American Edition) "Where the existence of a specific
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thing is essential to the performance of the contract, its destruction
through no fault of either party, operates as a termination of the
promissor's liability." A contract to let a music hall was ended
by the destruction by fire, of the hall before the time when the
letting was to be made. Taylor vs. Caldwell, 3 B. L. S. 826, Cf.
Appleby vs. Myers, L. R. 2 C. P. 651. The principle is recognized
in Wertz vs. Klinger, 25 Superior 523; Dixon vs. Breon, 22 Superior 340.
The learned court below has properly decided the cause, and
its judgment is
AFFIRMED.

WESLEY vs. CITY OF ERIE
Constitutional Law

-

Federal Constitution Amendment

Fourteenth

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Erie passed an ordinance, under authority of a statute, requiring all vendors of cigarettes to obtain a license and giving the
mayor the power to grant or refuse the license, as he believed or
not the applicant a fit person to have the power to sell then Wesley was refused the license as unfit, had nevertheless sold and was
fined $50 by the magistrate. He appeals to the court to restrain
the collection of the fine alleging that the ordinance in so far as
it gave the discretion to the mayor was void as violating the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Kravitz for the Plaintiff.
Forcey for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BITTLE, J.-The question raised by the facts is, whether
a city ordinance, passed under State authority, giving an official
discretionary power to grant licenses, where a license is required
to engage in a pursuit, abridges the privileges or immunities of
a citizen as provided for by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, where the designated official refuses the
license and one is adjudged guilty and ordered to pay a fine for
acting contrary to the ordinance.
The section of the Fourteenth Amendment invoked is, "No
state shall make or onforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the U. S."
The police power is defined as the expression of the instinct
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of self-preservation and protection characteristic of every living
creature; an inherent faculty and function of life, attributed to
all self-governing bodies as indispensable to their healthy existence and to the public welfare. It embraces all rules and regulations for the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and
quiet of persons and the preservation and security of property.
It is the power vested in the Legislature by the Constitution
to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties or
without not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall be judged
to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth and the
people of the same.
The municipality, a governmental agency, must have such
measure of the power as is necessary to enable it to perform its
governmental functions and also those municipal functions which
are "necessarily and inseparably incident" to its existence as a
corporation.
After repeated challenge of municipal authority to exercise
the police power, on the ground that it is a sovereign power and
therefore, non-delegable, the doctrine is firmly established and
now well recognized that the Legislature may expressly, or by
implication delegate to municipal corporations the lawful exercise
of police power within their boundaries.
The power is usually conferred on municipalities in express
terms of Constitution or statute and unless otherwise expressed
it is always construed as with general statute and the Constitution, both Federal and State.
In Powell vs. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 265, "The ordinance
in question was passed in pursuance of police power vested in
boroughs and cities of the Commonwealth. Upon such municipal
bodies the State confers a portion of its sovereignty for the purposE of enabling them to control their local affairs."
In the absence of any inhibition, express or implied in the
state constitution, the legislature may either in the exercise of
police power or for the purposes of revenue, levy license-taxes on
occupations within the limits of the state, provided such power
must be exercised in subordination to the requirements of the federal constitution. 25 Cyc. 599, 600.
In absence of constitutional inhibition, express or implied,
the legislature may delegate to municipal corporations, power to
levy and collect, occupation and privilege taxes within corporate
limits. Butler's Appeal, 73 Pa. 448; Durach's Appeal, 62 Pa.
491.
The doctrine "Potestas delegata non est delegari" operates
to prevent the governing body of a municipal corporation, in-
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trusted by the state with the police power, from delegating its
high functions to any other body or officer but is not construed
and applied to require the entire council to engage personally in
every step necessary for the exercise of the function. They may
fully discharge their official duty and exhaust the municipal discretion by enacting by-laws or ordinances to be executed by the
proper board or officer.
City councils may delegate to the mayor or like officer authority to carry out the police regulations of the city.
In 11 Pa. Superior Ct. 355, Wilkes-Barre vs. Joseph Garabed
at 372.
"It's not unreasonable, impartial or oppressive because the
power is to be exercised by the mayor, as he may deem expedient, which is equivalent to saying in his discretion and which
implies that it must be done with a sound discretion and according
to law. A hard and fast rule or a clearly defined one cannot be
laid down for the granting of such permits. The discretion to
be exercised is one of wide latitude and imports the exercise of
judgment, wisdom and skill as opposed to folly, passion and prejudice. The power to act must be lodged somewhere and the city
has seen proper to place it in the hands of its chief executive."
The term "discretionary" has a legal meaning with safe
limitations. The intendment of the law which grants it whether
expressly or by implication, is that the discretionary decision shall
be the outcome of examination and consideration, in other words
it shall constitute a discharge of official duty and not a mere expression of personal will. An arbitrary disapproval of a license,
determined upon without an examination of relevant facts and expressing nothing but the mood of the officer would not be in contemplation of law an exercise of the power granted. It would
constitute on the contrary, a neglect and refusal to perform his
official functions.
We find for the defendant and affirm the judgment entered.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The ordinance did not give to the mayor, an arbitrary discretion with respect to the grant of licenses to sell cigarettes. He
could not legally refuse the license because he disliked the applicant, because he was not good looking, because he was of Celtic or Teutonic origin, because he was old, etc. He was to consider only whether the applicant was a "fit" person to have the
power to sell cigarettes. The classification of persons into fit and
unfit is frequently made, with a view to sale of articles, cigarettes, liquor, etc. That some might be unfit, and others fit, to sell
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cigarettes is clear, and to confine the right to sale to the fit would
be entirely reasonable.
But who is to determine the existence or non-existence of
the fitness? Some one must be entrusted with the function. With
respect to liquor selling, the law of this state has put the discretion
in a judge of a court. He may decide whether the proposed place of
sale and the proposed vendor, are fit. The constitutionality of
this gift of power, has not been seriously challenged. So, the
power has at times been vested in a non-judicial officer.
The mayor of a city eannot be pronounced an unfit person
to decide who should have licenses for the sale of cigarettes. They
are not to be sold to young persons. In granting a license to sell,
some regard must be given to the character of the applicant. Will
he probably observe the restrictions which the law prescribes?
The subjection of the power to sell cigarettes, to the judgment of the mayor as to the fitness of the one who applies for a
license, is not a denial to persons of the equal protection of the
law, nor of life, liberty or privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States. Gundling vs. City of Chicago, 177 U. S. 183.
The judgment of the learned court below must be
AFFIRMED.

HARMAN'S

ESTATE

Spenthrift Trust-Subsequent Devise-Rights of Creditors
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Harman devised his farm to a trustee, in trust to pay
the net rental of it to his sons, Jacob and Thomas, for fifteen
years. During this time the land was not to be liable to be taken
for any debts of the sons nor should they have power to sell their
interest in the land or to pledge or to dispose of their share of the
rental. At the end of the fifteen years, the land was to be divided into two shares and one share was to be alloted to each. If
either should have died his share was to go to his heirs or devisees.
The trustee was to make a deed to each for his share. Jacob died
within the fifteen years, leaving a will in which he gave his land
to Sopor. In proceedings in partition the land was sold; $30,000
is the share of each son. This is claimed by Sopor and in opposition to him by the creditors of Jacob.
Shapiro for the Petitioner.
Werner for the Respondent.

DICKINSON LAW REvIEw
OPINION OF THE COURT
STONE, J.-The devise to the trustee created a spendthrift
trust for fifteen years in favor of the two sons. "Although a contrary doctrine has prevailed in England and in some of the
United States, spendthrift trusts, i. e. trusts intended to secure
the trust fund against the improvidence of the beneficiary by
protecting it from his creditors and rendering it inalienable by
him before payment, have generally been upheld as valid, not
out of any consideration for the beneficiary, but out of consideration for the right of the donor to control his bounty and dispose of his property in any manner he sees fit, provided it is not
repugnant to law." Trusts 39 Cyc. 40; Morgan's Est., 223 Pa.
228; 25 L. R. A. N. S. 236.
I have been unable to find many cases showing that a spendthrift trust may exist for a limited period of time at the termination of which time the estate will vest absolutely in the cestui and
the rarity of such cases furnishes a strong presumption that
such a trust is not a spendthrift trust; but in view of Fleming's
Est., 219 Pa. 422, where nothing to the contrary was said concerning such a trust and also on the principle that there can be no
serious objection although the cestui is also to receive the corpus,
provided it is not terminable at his option, I think that such a
trust as in this case is a valid spendthrift trust.
If either of the sons should have died within the fifteen years
his share was to go to his heir or devisee. From this provision
in the will I conclude that the sons had a general power of appointment which Jacob, who having died within the fifteen years
exercised in favor of Sopor, who is the appointee of the power.
Therefore the question" to be decided in this case, the answer to
which will be decisive of the rights of the creditors is "Whether
or not the exercise of a general power of appointment makes the
estate passing thereunder ipso facto assets for the payment of the
debts of the donee of the power?" Said donee in this case being
Jacob. If it does then the cerditors of Jacob have a right to have
their claims paid first. Or another way to put the question is,
Did Jacob at the time of his death own the land? If he did then
his debts remained a lien on his land for the period of one year
as provided for in Section 15, Fiduciaries Act of 1917, and on a
sale of his land the liens would have to be satisfied out of the
purchase money.
As an answer to the last question it is stated in Wilson Appeal, 45 Pa. 435 and in Breckle's Est., 22 Superior 12, -that "where
a decedent's real estate is sold in partition and the sale confimned
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within two years from the death of the decedent, and there is no
agreement among the heirs that all liens shall be paid out of the
fund realized by the sale, the land is sold subject to the lien of
decedent's debts, and a creditor of the decedent is not entitled to
participate in the proceeds of the sale." However, I think too
much stress cannot be laid on the above decisions since Section
26 of the Partition Act of 1917, states that "All sales of real estate, under the provisions of the act, shall have the effect -of judicial sales as to the discharge of liens upon the real estate so
sold."
But as to the answer to the question of the exercise of the
general power of appointment we may quote the doctrine laid
down in Pearce vs. Ledner, 262 Federal 993, wherein the following Pennsylvania cases are cited and discussed: Conun. vs. Williams' Est., 13 Pa. 29; Comm. vs. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277; Pepper's
Est., 120 Pa. 235; Swaby's Appeal, 14 W. N. C. 553. "Where
property has been devised to a trustee who holds under a spendthrift trust, the beneficiary has nothing until and as he receives,
and all of the property until actually received by the cestui remains the estate of the first testator, notwithstanding the fact that
the cestui may be the donee of the power of appointment by will
and may exercise it. The appointee, who takes, takes, when he
takes not under the will of the donee of the power, but under
the will of the donor." Comm. vs. Williams' Est., Supra. "The
act of June 4, 1879, P. L. 88, Section 3, in nowise alters the
law in this respect; its effect is to make the will of the donee of
an unrestricted absolute power operate as an exercise of the
power even though no such intention is expressed therein. The
law assumes that such was the intent of the testator unless a contrary intent appears by the will." Auket's Appeal, 109 Pa. 447.
In view of the above authorities cited holding that the exercise of a general power of appointment does not pass an estate
vested in the donee but passes to the appointee from the will of
the donor, I decide that the creditors have no claim in the distribution of the fund and that there are no liens.
BEN L. STONE,
Auditor.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The trust was to pay the net profits to Jacob and Thomas for
fifteen years. During this time, the land was not to be taken for
their debts, nor were they to sell their interest therein, or to
pledge, or dispose of it. We do not doubt that the spendthrift

DICKINSON LAW REvEw
trust during the fifteen years was valid. But that question is unimportant. No creditor is attempting to take the profits during
the fifteen years.
At the end of the fifteen years, the land was to be divided
into two shares, one of which was to go to Jacob, and the other
to Joseph. If either had died, his share was to go to his heirs, or
devisees.
The fifteen years have expired.
Proceedings in partition
have resulted in a sale of the land. The proceeds have been $30,000. Jacob has died within the fifteen years, and has devised
what would have been his interest, as he had the power to do, to
Sopor. Sopor claims, not merely as a devisee of Jacob, but under the will of John Harmon, which devised the land, after fifteen
years, alternatively to Jacob, or his heirs or devisees. These latter take under John Harmon's will. It matters not whether Jacob
was indebted or not, nor whether the spendthrift feature of the
trust extended (as it did not) to the interest following
the fifteen years. That interest was only Jacob's, if he survived.
If not, it was his heirs' or devisees.' The creditors have nothing
to which they can resort for the payment of their- debts. What
would have been his share, had he survived the fifteen years, has
become the property of his devisee, Sopor, not because it was
Jacob's, but because John Harmon devised it to Jacob's devisee.
Jacob had a power to appoint a devisee; a substitute for himself,
who took John's estate, under John's devise.
Of. Fleming's Estate, 219 Pa. 422, a case some of whose features are reproduced in this.
The decree of the learned court below is
AFFIRMED.

